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Political gerrymandering has essentially eliminated competitive 
elections for decades, leaving “[o]nly a small fraction of seats [seeing] 
meaningful competition in recent elections; the vast majority . . . are de-
cided the day the district maps are drawn.”1 In 2017, the U.S. Supreme 
Court developed a newfound interest in gerrymandering, leaving open the 
possibility that it could reform and reshape American democracy, and as-
sist in ending the, at least, 207-year-old practice.2 
By definition, a gerrymander is: 
[T]he process of dividing a state or other territory into the author-
ized civil or political divisions, but with such a geographical ar-
rangement as to accomplish a sinister or unlawful purpose, as, for 
instance, to secure a majority for a given political party in districts 
where the result would be otherwise if they were divided accord-
ing to obvious natural lines.3 
“Packing” and “cracking” are two specific methods of gerrymander-
ing. Packing “involves overly saturating one legislative district with the 
opposition party’s voters so that their influence is limited to the confines 
of [that] district.”4 Cracking, on the other hand, “involves splitting the 
opposition party’s voters into many districts as a way of minimizing their 
impact.”5 While technically correct, these definitions do not capture the 
legal and social ramifications of gerrymandering; the aftermath of which 
can be seen in election results today. Perhaps more appropriately, political 
 
 1 Alex Whitman, Pinpoint Redistricting and the Minimization of Partisan Gerrymander-
ing, 59 EMORY L.J. 211, 212 (2009) (citations omitted). 
 2 Eric Randall, Throwback Thursday: Happy Birthday, Gerrymandering, BOS. MAG. 
(Mar. 26, 2015, 1:09 PM), https://perma.cc/UV3G-CL2Z. 
 3 Gerrymander, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910). For the most recent definition 
see gerrymandering, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The practice of dividing a 
geographical area into electoral districts, often of highly irregular shape, to give one political 
party an unfair advantage by diluting the opposition’s voting strength.”). 
 4 Sarah Friedmann, How Does “Packing & Cracking” Work? ‘Last Week Tonight’ Tack-
led the Intricacies of Gerrymandering, BUSTLE (Apr. 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/E6WL-
QV8T; Complaint at 3, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16–1161). 
 5 Friedmann, supra note 4; Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1924 (citing plaintiffs’ complaint). 
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gerrymandering includes an implied requisite intent element in its defini-
tion: “[t]he practice of dividing a geographical area into electoral districts, 
often of highly irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair ad-
vantage by diluting the opposition’s voting strength.”6 
This article will accomplish two tasks. First, it will address how po-
litical gerrymandering presents a hybrid-question for courts—a political 
and a constitutional question grounded in the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Second, this article will discuss two diverging challenges: 
the first being the federal challenges under the United States Constitution 
in Gill v. Whitford and Benisek v. Lamone, and the second being the Penn-
sylvania state constitutional challenge in League of Women Voters of 
Pennsylvania. Ultimately, this article seeks to provide a roadmap for suc-
cessful challenges to political gerrymandering. Although federal remedies 
appear limited, this article argues that gerrymandering can be successfully 
measured, challenged, and cured in state courts and by state legislatures. 
I. LIMITATIONS 
Unsurprisingly, the line between diminishing minority votes based 
on race and diluting or inflating the votes of a certain political party is 
rather thin.7 While the authors attempt to solely address political gerry-
mandering, it is important to recognize that this practice is one limb of the 
larger beast. Thus, this article does not address the ramifications of racial 
gerrymandering, nor the potential gerrymandering claims that arise from 
census sampling.8 Instead, it solely addresses challenges to politically ger-
rymandered district maps that have existed for over half a century without 
an answer from the Supreme Court.9 
II. HISTORY OF GERRYMANDERING 
Like a living organism, gerrymandering has evolved through the 
ages—yet the tenets of this political practice trace back to the early history 
of the United States.10 Notoriously, in 1812, the Massachusetts legislature 
 
 6 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 271 n.1 (2004) (plurality opinion) (citing Gerryman-
dering, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999)). 
 7 Friedmann, supra note 4. 
 8 See Linda Greenhouse, Jarring Democrats, Court Rules Census Must Be by Actual 
Count, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 1999), https://perma.cc/JW3Z-V8S9, for a discussion of census 
sampling. 
 9 Gill, 138 U.S. at 1926 (“Over the past five decades this Court has been repeatedly asked 
to decide what judicially enforceable limits, if any, the Constitution sets on the gerrymander-
ing of voters along partisan lines.”). 
 10 See generally Emily Barasch, The Twisted History of Gerrymandering in American 
Politics, ATLANTIC (Sept. 19, 2012), http://perma.cc/W534-GULB. 
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passed a bill eventually signed by then-governor Elbridge Gerry,11 that 
altered voting district lines into unnatural shapes in order to maintain ma-
jority control.12 After seeing the new map, “an editor for the Boston Ga-
zette, which supported the opposing Federalist party, looked at the odd 
shape of the new district and supposedly declared, ‘Salamander! Call it a 
Gerrymander!’”13 Later, the Boston Gazette (“Gazette”) published the 
famed cartoon that immortalized the “gerrymander,” a “lizard-like 
winged beast with claws in Marblehead and jaws in Salsbury.”14 The art 
of gerrymandering has since reared its lizard-like shape beyond the 
bounds of ancestral Massachusetts and into Ohio’s “Lake Erie Mon-
ster,”15 and Pennsylvania’s “Goofy Kicking Donald Duck.”16 These odd 
shapes and anti-contiguous maps have led to First Amendment and Equal 
Protection litigation, as well as Fifteenth Amendment litigation of racial 
gerrymanders, most recently in Wisconsin, Texas, Pennsylvania, Mary-
land, and North Carolina.17 
 
 11 See Erick Trickey, Where Did the Term “Gerrymander” Come from?, SMITHSONIAN 
MAG. (July 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/XP3R-YJJW, for a discussion of Elbridge Gerry. The 
Trickey article provides that: Governor Gerry “was a Founding Father: signer of the Declara-
tion of Independence, reluctant framer of the Constitution, congressman, diplomat, and the 
fifth vice-president.” Id. He was also a “trusted confidant of John Adams” and “a dyspeptic 
hothead–a trait that got the better of him when he signed the infamous redistricting bill.” Id. 
Adams once wrote, “[i]f every Man here was a Gerry . . . the Liberties of America would be 
safe against the Gates of Earth and Hell.” Id. Furthermore, “across his long career, Gerry took 
principled stands for the Revolution, the American republic, limited government, and the Bill 
of Rights. But when his fears became obsessions, he overreacted and compromised his prin-
ciples” in signing the redistricting bill. Id. 
 12 See id. (“[T]he freakishly shaped district elected three Democratic-Republicans that 
year, 1812, breaking up the county’s previous delegation of five Federalist senators.”); Robert 
Draper, The League of Dangerous Mapmakers, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 2012), 
https://perma.cc/A3K6-BYJ8. 
 13 Randall, supra note 2. Other accounts also attribute the monster drawing to illustrator 
Elkanah Tisdale at a party hosted by a prominent Federalist. Trickey, supra note 11. Guests 
quipped about what the drawing looked like, until poet Richard Alsop coined the phrase Ger-
rymander. Id. 
 14 Randall, supra note 2; Trickey, supra note 11 (“Gerry’s Federalist opponents saw the 
bill as another injury from his partisan vendetta. They responded with a satire so piercing, it 
has overshadowed all of Gerry’s other accomplishments in history.”). 
 15 Trickey, supra note 11. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1919 (2018) (Wisconsin); Perez v. Abbott, 274 F. 
Supp. 3d 624, 636 (W.D. Tex. 2017), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018) (Texas); League of Women 
Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 787 (Pa. 2018) (Pennsylvania); 
Benisek v. Lamone, No. 1:13-cv-03233-JKB, 2018 WL 5816831, at *13 (D. Md. Nov. 7, 
2018) (Maryland); Common Cause v. Rucho, 240 F. Supp. 3d 376, 377 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (per 
curiam) (North Carolina). Despite being declared unconstitutional, the District Court for the 
Middle District of North Carolina ultimately upheld the map’s use in the 2018 midterms as 
“imposing a new schedule for North Carolina’s congressional elections would, at this late 
juncture, unduly interfere with the State’s electoral machinery and likely confuse voters and 
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III. POLITICAL QUESTION HYBRIDITY OF VOTING RIGHTS BEFORE THE 
SUPREME COURT: IS POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING REVIEWABLE? 
Between 1842 and 1911, Congress passed several Acts detailing re-
quirements for electoral districts.18 While state mapmakers took liberties 
with these requirements from the time of their enactment, it was not until 
1962 that the Supreme Court heard a challenge by voters stemming from 
impermissible apportionments in Tennessee.19 This challenge has subse-
quently provided the foundation for gerrymandering cases to question 
whether the matter is one that the Court can resolve.20 All gerrymandering 
evaluations by the Supreme Court, political or otherwise, have since be-
gun with the analysis of what constitutes a justiciable, versus a political, 
question.21 
The political question doctrine dates back to Marbury v. Madison.22 
The Court in Marbury distinguished the difference between the nature of 
the political and legal questions and held the former cannot be answered 
in a court of law; rather, political questions must be addressed at the ballot 
box.23 Baker v. Carr, the Tennessee redistricting challenge from 1962, 
presented the doctrinal limitation for what is justiciable in apportion-
ment.24 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, provided factors to eval-
uate whether an issue presents a question best answered in a court of law 
or by the vote of the people.25 Such factors include: 
[T]extually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue 
to a coordinate political department; a lack of judicially discover-
able and manageable standards for resolving [the issue]; impossi-
bility for a court’s independent resolution without expressing a 
 
depress turnout.” James Doubek, North Carolina Can Use Gerrymandered Map in November, 
Court Rules, NPR (Sept. 5, 2018, 7:55 AM), https://perma.cc/JBP9-N5MV. The North Caro-
lina map cannot be used, however, post-2018. 
 18 Apportionment Act of 1911, Pub. L. No. 62-5, ch. 5, § 3, 37 Stat. 13, 14; Apportion-
ment Act of 1901, ch. 93, § 3, 31 Stat. 733, 734; Apportionment Act of 1862, ch. 170, 12 Stat. 
572, 572; Apportionment Act of 1842, ch. 47 § 2, 5 Stat. 491, 491. 
 19 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 20 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 271-72 (2004) (plurality opinion); Nixon v. United 
States, 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 291 
(2d Cir. 2007); League of Women Voters of Nassau Cty. v. Nassau Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 
737 F.2d 155, 161 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 21 See infra notes 39 and 41. 
 22 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803) (“Questions, in their nature political, or 
which are, to the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this 
court.”). 
 23 Id. 
 24 Baker, 369 U.S. 186. 
 25 Id. at 222-37. 
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lack of respect for a coordinate branch of government; impossi-
bility of deciding the issue without an initial policy decision, 
which is beyond the discretion of the court; unusual need for un-
questioning adherence to a political decision already made; po-
tentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by 
various departments on one question.26 
Further, Justice Brennan aptly noted, “the mere fact that the suit 
seeks protection of a political right does not mean it presents a political 
question. Such an objection ‘is little more than a play upon words.’”27 
While the Baker Court left the justiciability door cracked open, 
judges continue to grapple with the political question doctrine in today’s 
challenges to redistricting and, more specifically, political gerrymander-
ing.28 For instance, the Court held that gerrymandering was a justiciable 
question under the Equal Protection Clause in Davis v. Bandemer in 
1986.29 However, Davis was called in to question by Vieth v. Jubelirer in 
2004.30 
IV. THE MEAT AND POTATOES: IS POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING 
CONSTITUTIONAL? 
Vieth, although not decided in the plaintiffs’ favor, contained the last 
thread of hope for apportionment challengers begging federal courts to 
intervene: Justice Kennedy’s “cryptic concurrence.”31 While he sided 
with the conservative majority, Justice Kennedy effectively urged future 
challengers to provide the Court with a workable test with which to re-
view gerrymandering claims; for all intents and purposes, he broadcasts 
himself as the swing vote.32 Notably, he stated: 
While agreeing with the plurality that the complaint the appellants 
filed in the District Court must be dismissed, and while under-
standing that great caution is necessary when approaching this 
subject, I would not foreclose all possibility of judicial relief if 
 
 26 Id. at 217. 
 27 Id. at 209 (quoting Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927)). 
 28 See Garrett Epps, The Supreme Court’s Choice on Partisan Gerrymandering, 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 28, 2018), https://perma.cc/48PG-5XDW. 
 29 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986) (plurality opinion). 
 30 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 303 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 31 Kim E. Rinehart et al., Supreme Court Update: Gill v. Whitford, Benise v. Lamone, 
NAT’L L. REV. (June 24, 2018), https://perma.cc/KKC4-JC5C; see also Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 32 See David Daley, Who Will Justice Kennedy Believe When it Comes to Gerrymander-
ing?, NEW YORKER (Oct. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/83U8-SCJ4. 
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some limited and precise rationale were found to correct an estab-
lished violation of the Constitution in some redistricting cases.33 
Thus, it should be noted that Justice Kennedy’s retirement dimin-
ishes the prospect of an to end partisan gerrymandering.34 Any and all 
strategies to appeal to Justice Kennedy’s call to discover the “limited and 
precise rationale”35 after attempts made by mordern cases discusses fur-
ther in this article must be reworked to the call of a new Justice or to the 
possibility of a sitting Justice becoming the new swing vote.36 
A. Democrats Challenge Republicans on Wisconsin Map: Gill v. 
Whitford 
Gill was the first of two seminal political gerrymandering companion 
cases heard by the Supreme Court in Fall 2017. Gill was a challenge to a 
Republican-drawn map from Wisconsin in 2011.37 After Wisconsin Re-
publicans handily increased their majority in both the 2012 election cycle 
and 2014 midterms,38 twelve liberal voters sought both a declaratory judg-
ment, arguing that the Republican’s use of the map violated the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, and an injunction against the map’s use in the 
2016 election.39 According to their complaint, “[s]ome of the plaintiffs 
[had] been packed into districts with other Democratic voters, while oth-
ers live[d] in districts that [were] cracked by the Current Plan to disad-
vantage Democratic candidates in close races.”40 Recognizing that “a con-
stitutional challenge ha[d] yet to succeed on [partisan gerrymandering 
grounds],”41 petitioners distinguished their claim and presented a new, 
workable, mathematical test based on “the idea that a district plan should 
treat the major parties symmetrically with respect to the conversion of 
 
 33 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 34 Michael Wines, Kennedy’s Retirement Could Threaten Efforts to End Partisan Gerry-
mandering, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/MJ3J-282K. 
 35 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 36 See Sam Levine, Anthony Kennedy’s Retirement Is a Bad Sign for Fixing Gerryman-
dering, HUFFPOST (June 28, 2018, 1:16 PM), https://perma.cc/49B6-6CR9 (discussing how 
both sitting and future Supreme Court justices might take J. Kennedy’s place as a potential 
swing vote). 
 37 Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Cautious Optimism for Challengers in Wisconsin Re-
districting Case?, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 3, 2017, 2:13 PM), https://perma.cc/ASF7-VDRD. 
 38 Id. (“In the 2012 elections, Republicans won slightly less than half of the statewide 
vote, which translated into 60 seats in the state’s 99-seat assembly; by contrast, Democrats 
won just over half of the statewide vote but garnered only 39 seats. Two years later, Republi-
cans won 52% of the vote and 63 seats, while Democrats won approximately 48% of the vote 
and 36 seats.”). 
 39 Complaint at 1, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 3:15-cv-00421-bbc). 
 40 Id. at 6. 
 41 Id. at 3. 
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votes to seats and that neither party should have a systematic advantage 
in how efficiently its popular support translates into legislative power.”42 
This is known as partisan symmetry.43 
The test at the heart of Gill, developed in 2015 by Nicholas Stepha-
nopoulos and Eric McGhee, is better known as the Efficiency Gap (“the 
Gap”).44 The Gap attempts to measure wasted votes—votes that are either 
cast for a candidate who lost, or votes in excess of what the winning can-
didate needed.45 Overall, the numbers suggest that partisan gerrymander-
ing occurs in cases where there is a large difference between the parties’ 
wasted votes in a given election.46 Accordingly, “[w]hen the efficiency 
gap is relatively small and roughly equivalent to the efficiency gaps that 
have traditionally existed, the map should not be deemed unconstitu-
tional.”47 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court did not respond to the accuracy of the 
Gap and declined to decide the case on the merits.48 Chief Justice Roberts, 
writing for the majority, concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing be-
cause, although they alleged that they had a personal stake in the reappor-
tionment map, they never followed up with the requisite proof.49 As a 
result, the case was remanded.50 
B. Republicans Challenge Democrats’ Maryland Map: Benisek v. 
Lamone 
During the same Term, the Supreme Court heard arguments for and 
decided Benisek, a challenge to a Democrat-drawn map from Maryland 
following the 2010 Census.51 The case follows a complaint filed by John 
 
 42 Id. 
 43 Anthony J. McGann, et al., We Have a Standard for Judging Partisan Gerrymandering. 
The Supreme Court Should Use It, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/CDA3-C5TT; 
Andrew Gelman & Gary King, A Unified Method of Evaluating Electoral Systems and Redis-
tricting Plans, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 514, 536 (1994). 
 44 ERIC PETRY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., HOW THE EFFICIENCY GAP WORKS 1 (2017), 
https://perma.cc/C3MW-33MH. 
 45 Id.; Epps, supra note 28. 
 46 LAURA ROYDEN & MICHAEL LI, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, EXTREME MAPS 4 (2017), 
http://perma.cc/384S-RGDV. 
 47 Complaint at 3, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 3:15-cv-00421-bbc). 
 48 See Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1934. 
 49 Id. at 1923. 
 50 Id. 
 51 See Amy Howe, Argument Preview: For the Second Time This Term, Justices to Take 
up Partisan Gerrymandering, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 23, 2018, 10:53 AM), 
https://perma.cc/R9G3-4XJQ. 
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Benisek, a Maryland resident, who sued the state after the Sixth Congres-
sional District was redrawn to unseat a Republican.52 
Benisek relied heavily on the First Amendment Freedom of Associ-
ation but offered no metric by which the Court could calculate political 
gerrymandering.53 The plaintiffs argued that the Court did not need math-
ematics to decide in their favor, just common sense: 
Unlike the equal-protection approach to partisan gerrymandering, 
the First Amendment retaliation framework does not depend on a 
unifying definition of “fairness” or require courts to determine 
when a map has gone “too far.” It instead asks whether the State 
has imposed a real and practical burden (one that is more than de 
minimis) in retaliation for past political support for the opposition 
party . . . . As this Court’s ballot-access cases make clear, the in-
quiry is pragmatic and functional, turning not on statistical 
measures of imbalance, but on the practical effects of a gerryman-
der themselves.54 
In a per curiam opinion, the Court again declined to address political 
gerrymandering on the merits, finding the plaintiffs in Benisek failed to 
show that the district court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ 
preliminary injunction.55 The Court also held that it would be against the 
public interest to enjoin the map, “as an injunction might have worked a 
needlessly ‘chaotic and disruptive effect upon the electoral process.’”56  
Consequently, Gill and Benisek are major setbacks that have “erected 
substantive barriers to political gerrymandering claims” in the future.57 
While it is likely that the Supreme Court will hear Gill again,58 Benisek is 
indicative of the Court’s unwillingness to frustrate the electoral process.59 
 
 52 Neal Earley, Supreme Court to Wait on Maryland Gerrymandering Case, 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY SENTINEL (June 21, 2018), https://perma.cc/5LC7-EWCQ. 
 53 See Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018) (per curiam). 
 54 Brief of Appellants at 27, Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018) (No. 17-333) 
(emphasis added). 
 55 Benisek, 138 S. Ct. at 1945. 
 56 Id. (citing Fishman v. Schaffer, 429 U.S. 1325, 1330 (1976)). 
 57 John Phillippe, Symposium: Back to the Drawing Board for Political Gerrymandering 
Plaintiffs, SCOTUSBLOG (June 19, 2018, 5:05 PM), https://perma.cc/Z7L3-NWJE. 
 58 David Gans, Symposium: The Fight to Vindicate Our Constitution’s Promise of De-
mocracy Is Far from Over, SCOTUSBLOG (June 19, 2018, 11:14 AM), 
https://perma.cc/UTF5-FVYR. 
 59 Benisek, 138 S. Ct. at 1945. 
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V. ENTER STATE-BASED CHALLENGES: A NEW SUPERIOR AVENUE AND 
METRIC TO ADDRESS GERRYMANDERING WHERE THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
BEARS LITTLE CONSEQUENCE 
As a re-invocation of federalism and the Tenth Amendment, chal-
lengers to political gerrymandering experience greater success in state 
courts, where individual state constitutions often provide heightened pro-
tections.60 The Tenth Amendment provides that the federal government 
only has specifically enumerated power over the states when specifically 
enumerated.61 Otherwise, the powers to decide and act are reserved to the 
individual states.62 State courts grant additional, broader protections to 
their citizens where the federal government and the Supreme Court do 
not;63 this is evident in the realm of political gerrymandering where state 
courts have deemed the practice a justiciable question and specifically 
unconstitutional.64 As the initial panel of judges noted in Gill, the “[r]eap-
portionment of state legislative districts is a responsibility constitutionally 
vested in the state government.”65 
Prior to the most recent challenges, state courts have ruled against 
gerrymandering even without a clear way to measure its effects.66 The 
Iowa Supreme Court opposed political gerrymandering over forty years 
ago, and the state has since been seen as a pinnacle of free and fair elec-
tions.67 In 1972, voters in several Iowa districts sought to invalidate redis-
tricting plans presented and approved by the state legislature following 
 
 60 See, e.g., League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 175 A.3d 282, 
284 (Pa. 2018) (finding that the Congressional Redistricting Act of 2011 violates the state 
constitution). 
 61 See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the 
people.”). 
 62 See e.g New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992). 
 63 See, e.g., League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 
822 (Pa. 2018) (finding that the courts are suited to step in where the legislature does not act 
to remedy an unconstitutional redistricting plan); In re Legislative Districting of Gen. Assem-
bly, 193 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1972). 
 64 See Ronald K.L. Collins, Looking to the States, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 29, 1986, at S; see 
also League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania, 178 A.3d 737 (Pa. 2018). 
 65 Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 844 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916 
(2018); see also Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975) (“[R]eapportionment is primarily 
the duty and responsibility of the State through its legislature or other body, rather than of a 
federal court.”). 
 66 See, e.g., In re Legislative Districting of Gen. Assembly, 193 N.W.2d at 788 (Iowa 
1972). 
 67 Erin Murphy, Evidence of Gerrymandering Prevalent Across U.S., but Not in Iowa, 
SIOUX CITY J. (June 27, 2017), https://perma.cc/Q6VY-5A9U. 
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the 1970 U.S. Census because of their deviations from the standard pop-
ulation of the state at the time.68 Relying on Burns v. Richardson, the Iowa 
Supreme Court sought to determine whether the districts constituted in-
vidious discrimination.69 The court held that invidiousness can be found 
where “a conscious effort is obviously present to devise and propose a 
plan which the legislature would adopt because [it] would protect indi-
vidual legislators at the pools, and districts lacking population equality or 
compactness are created for this political purpose.”70 Thus, without a met-
ric such as the equation provided in Gill, and without specifically invok-
ing a section in the Federal Constitution, the Iowa Supreme Court found 
that political gerrymandering is not only justiciable,71 but also unconsti-
tutional.72 
A. The State Challenge to the Pennsylvania Map 
In June 2017, the League of Women Voters and eighteen registered 
Democrats (one from each congressional district in Pennsylvania) sued 
Pennsylvania state officials asserting that the state’s 2011 redistricting 
plan violated the Pennsylvania Constitution.73 The Pennsylvania Consti-
tution provides for elections that are truly fair and equal.74 Unlike other 
state constitutions75 and the Federal Constitution, Pennsylvania’s Free 
 
 68 In re Legislative Districting of Gen. Assembly, 193 N.W. at 785-86, 789 (quoting In re 
Legislative Districting of Gen. Assembly, 175 N.W.2d 20, 26 (Iowa 1970)) (“[I]t is apparent 
from the record that in the commission plan as filed there are instances of districts being cre-
ated to facilitate keeping present members in office and others providing boundaries to avoid 
having present members contest each other at the polls. The legislature made no apparent 
revision of the commission plan in this respect when enacting House File 781. When such 
factors enter into reapportionment it cannot be said that ‘a good faith effort to establish districts 
substantially equal in population has been made.’”) (citing League of Nebraska Municipalities 
v. Marsh, 242 F. Supp. 357, 360-61 (D. Neb. 1965)). 
 69 In re Legislative Districting of Gen. Assembly, 193 N.W.2d at 790. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 789 (“This court will retain jurisdiction of this matter, and will file opinion sup-
plemental hereto to reflect the plan of apportionment developed by it in accord with the con-
stitutional direction.”). 
 72 Id. at 790. 
 73 See generally League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 
737 (Pa. 2018). 
 74 PA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Elections shall be free and equal; and no power, civil or military, 
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.”). 
 75 The Iowa Constitution contains the language “Shall be entitled to vote” but not a guar-
antee of free and equal elections. See IOWA CONST. art II, § 1; contra, Arizona, Arkansas, 
Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana and 20 other states do have similar provisions to this 
language. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 21, art. VII, § 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2; COLO. CONST. 
art. VII, § 1, art. II, § 5; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2, art. I, § 3; ILL. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 3; and 
IND. CONST. art. II, §§ 1-2. For a great in-depth analysis of this provisional information see 
Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89 (2014). 
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and Equal Election Clause has been interpreted to entitle citizens to re-
prieve from political gerrymandering.76 Therefore, the Pennsylvania 
plaintiffs had a state-based cause of action.77 Though an initial stay was 
granted in the case, petitioners sought extraordinary relief and the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court granted expedited review, remanding the case to 
the Commonwealth Court for trial in December 2017.78 The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court subsequently heard arguments on January 17, 2018.79Alt-
hough not reviewable by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the expert tes-
timony presented by four witnesses, Doctors Jowei Chen, John Kennedy, 
Wesley Pegdon, and Christopher Warshaw, is most noteworthy as a meas-
urable metric offered in the trial record.80 
1.   Dr. Jowei Chen: Evaluating Modern Algorithmic Redistricting 
Simulations 
Dr. Jowei Chen, a redistricting research expert, took a three-prong 
approach to evaluating Pennsylvania’s 2011 redistricting plan (“the Penn-
sylvania Plan”): 
(1) whether partisan intent was the predominant factor in drawing 
of the Plan;  
(2) if so, what was the effect of the Plan on the number of con-
gressional Democrats and Republicans elected from Pennsylva-
nia; and  
(3) the effect of the Plan on the ability of the 18 individual peti-
tioners to elect a Democrat or Republican candidate for congress 
[sic] from their respective districts.81 
Using a computer algorithm, Dr. Chen created two sets of 500 redis-
tricting plans.82 The first set used “traditional Pennsylvania districting cri-
teria,”83 and the second set used additional criteria to protect the seventeen 
 
 76 See PA. CONST. art. I, § 5; League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Common-
wealth, 178 A.3d 737 (Pa. 2018). 
 77 PA. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 78 League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d at 766-67 (Pa. 
2018). 
 79 Id. at 767. 
 80 Id. at 770-79. 
 81 Id. at 770 (citation omitted). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. (“[P]opulation equality; contiguity; compactness; absence of splits within munici-
palities, unless necessary; and absence of splits within counties, unless necessary.”) (citation 
omitted). 
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incumbent legislators to determine if the additional factor could prove in-
tent, and to account for the extreme partisan bias present in the Pennsyl-
vania Plan.84 
Set one, using only traditional redistricting criteria, resulted in only 
fourteen counties being divided into multiple congressional districts85 
which that is in contrast to the twenty-eight counties split into multiple 
districts under the Pennsylvania Plan.86 The maximum number of districts 
that were split in that same simulation was sixteen.87 Furthermore, the 
majority of simulations ran under the traditional approach rendered 
twelve to fourteen split counties, in contrast to the sixty-eight split coun-
ties present in the Pennsylvania Plan, showcasing the presence of undue 
influence.88 
Dr. Chen’s model also addressed geographic compactness using two 
widely accepted scoring techniques: The Reock Compactness Score and 
the Popper-Polsby Compactness Score.89 As Professor Justin Levitt has 
aptly noted, “Few states precisely define what ‘compactness’ means . . . . 
Most observers look to measures of a district’s geometric shape”90 as re-
quired by the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims.91After hundreds of sim-
ulations the Pennsylvania Plan appeared to be the least compact: 
[N]o matter which measure of compactness [Dr. Chen used], it 
[was] very clear that the [Pennsylvania Plan] significantly and 
 
 84 League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania, 178 A.3d at 770-71. Other algorithmic sam-
pling methods have been used to evaluate the fairness of redistricting plans for Pennsylvania. 
Taylor McNeil, Tufts Mathematician to Aid in Pennsylvania Gerrymandering Case, 
TUFTSNOW (Jan. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/HD47-CQA9. 
 85 League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania, 178 A.3d at 771. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 773. 
 88 Id at 772. 
 89 Id. at 771. The Reock Compactness Score, the first model evaluated, is a “ratio of a 
particular district’s area to the area of the smallest bounding circle that can be drawn to com-
pletely contain the district . . . .”. The Popper-Polsby Compactness Score examines compact-
ness “by first measuring each district’s perimeter and comparing it to the area of a hypothetical 
circle with that same perimeter. The ratio of the particular district’s area to the area of the 
hypothetical circle is [the] . . . Score” assigned. Id. For greater discussion on compactness and 
the measurement of the Reock Score, see Stephen Ansolabehere & Maxwell Palmer, A Two 
Hundred-Year Statistical History of the Gerrymander, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 741, 743, 746-47 
(2016). 
 90 Where Are the Lines Drawn, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING: PROFESSOR JUSTIN LEVITT’S 
GUIDE TO DRAWING THE ELECTORAL LINES, https://perma.cc/T64H-697F (last visited Jan. 18, 
2018). 
 91 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964). 
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completely sacrifice[d] the traditional districting principle of ge-
ographic compactness compared to the sorts of plans that would 
have emerged under traditional redistricting principles.92 
In Set Two, which included the protection of the seventeen incum-
bents, Dr. Chen found fifteen split counties, compared to the twenty-eight 
counties in the Pennsylvania Plan.93 Additionally, the Pennsylvania Plan 
split far more municipalities than any of the simulated models.94 Using 
real election data from Pennsylvania, Dr. Chen noted that the Plan re-
sulted in thirteen Republican districts, and in no simulated model did the 
Republican candidates retain more than ten districts.95 Taking into ac-
count the Republican geographic advantage, the outcome of the map was 
unnatural and implausible.96 Dr. Chen noted, “an effort to protect incum-
bents would not have justified splitting up as many counties and as many 
municipalities as we saw split up in the [Pennsylvania] Plan.”97 
Dr. Chen’s findings were not without critique, however, as respond-
ents introduced through the testimony of Dr. Nolan McCarty, a Princeton 
University expert in redistricting and political analysis.98 Dr. McCarty ex-
amined Dr. Chen’s findings and characterized the results as “imperfect,” 
countering that the Partisan Voting Index (“PVI”), based on presidential 
voting returns, showcased the underperformance of Democrats.99 Estab-
lished in 1997, the PVI seeks to measure how “each district performs at 
the presidential level compared to the nation as a whole.”100 The court did 
not find Dr. McCarty’s testimony convincing and sided with Dr. Chen.101 
2.   Dr. John Kennedy: Evaluating the Political Geography 
The plaintiffs’ second expert witness, Dr. John Kennedy, a specialist 
in political geography from West Chester University, also examined the 
Pennsylvania Plan.102 Upon examination of the Pennsylvania Plan and 
 
 92 League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania, 178 A.3d at 772. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania, 178 A.3d at 773 (“[P]artisan intent subordi-
nated traditional districting principles in the drawing the enacted plan.”) (citation omitted). 
 96 Id. at 774. 
 97 Id. at 772. 
 98 Id. at 780. 
 99 Id. (arguing that Democratic underperformance was due, in part at least, to candidate 
quality, incumbency, spending, national tides, and trends within the electorate). 
 100 David Wasserman & Ally Flinn, Introducing the 2017 Cook Political Report Partisan 
Voter Index, COOK POL. REP. (Apr. 7, 2017), http://perma.cc/Q3VD-4ZME. 
 101 League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania, 178 A.3d at 780-81. 
 102 Id. at 775 (“[T]o see how it treated communities of interest, whether there were anom-
alies present, whether there are strangely designed districts, whether there are things that don’t 
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evaluation of the map for potential packing or cracking, Dr. Kennedy 
found that it negatively affected Pennsylvania’s communities of interest 
to an unprecedented degree.103 He also found that it contained more anom-
alies than ever before.104 For example, Dr. Kennedy found that, under the 
Pennsylvania Plan, the state’s Seventh District cracked Democratic voters 
into staunch Republican districts where their votes were diluted to the 
point that they no longer mattered.105 To examine the impact of district 
packing, Dr. Kennedy pointed to the First District, where the Pennsylva-
nia Plan had consolidated Democrats to reduce the potential negative im-
pact on Republican districts.106 Dr. Kennedy concluded that the Plan had 
been gerrymandered because it “[gave] precedence to political consider-
ations over considerations of communities of interest” and disadvantaged 
Democratic voters.107 
3.   Dr. Wesley Pegden: Evaluating Probability to Showcase 
Partisan Bias 
The third expert, Dr. Wesley Pegden, a mathematics professor at 
Carnegie Mellon University, testified to the presence of political gerry-
mandering after generating one trillion random, small changes to the 
Pennsylvania Plan.108 He found that nearly 100%109 of his manufactured 
plans were less partisan than the Pennsylvania Plan, which led Dr. Pegden 
to describe the plan as, “carefully crafted to ensure a [majority] ad-
vantage.”110 To combat Dr. Pegden, the Commonwealth introduced Dr. 
Wendy K. Tam Cho’s testimony, but she conceded at trial that she had 
not reviewed Dr. Pedgen’s metrics, algorithms, or codes.111 As a result, 
the court gave little weight to Dr. Cho’s testimony and even less weight 
to her conclusions.112 
 
make sense, whether there are tentacles, whether there are isthmuses [and] whether there are 
other peculiarities.”) (citation omitted). 
 103 Id. (recognizing that communities of interest can include political affiliations of the 
community). 
 104 Id. 
 105 See id. at 776. 
 106 See id. 
 107 League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania, 178 A.3d at 776. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. (finding 99.999999% were less biased than the Pennsylvania Plan). 
 110 Id. (citation omitted). 
 111 Id. at 779. 
 112 Id. at 780. 
2019] BREAKING THE BALLOT BOX 119 
4.   Dr. Christopher Warshaw: Evaluating Gerrymandering from a 
Historical Perspective 
The final expert, Dr. Christopher Warshaw, an assistant professor of 
political science at George Washington University, noted the utility of 
Gill’s efficiency gap in determining the amount of wasted votes.113 Using 
the Gap metric, Dr. Warshaw found that historically, the Pennsylvania 
efficiency gap hovered close to zero, as it should in states with more than 
six congressional districts.114 However, following the enactment of the 
Pennsylvania Plan, the efficiency gap was between 15% and 24% in the 
majority’s favor, such that Pennsylvania had the second largest efficiency 
gap since 1972 when one-person, one-vote went into effect.115 
B. Federalism and the 2011 Pennsylvania Plan 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court thus found the Pennsylvania Plan 
“clearly, plainly, and palpably violate[d] the Free and Equal Elections 
Clause of our Constitution.”116 With no federal counterpart to protect 
electoral rights, the court held that the state constitution incorporates all 
aspects of the electoral process, and mandates that all voters must have an 
equal opportunity for their votes to translate to representation.117 
Foremost, the court focused on the language of the state constitu-
tional provision “free and equal.”118 Historically, “free and equal” has not 
been narrowly defined, but interpreted broadly to not only protect indi-
viduals, but also to exclude “all invidious discriminations between indi-
vidual electors, or classes of electors, [and] also between different sec-
tions or places in the State.”119 The court further noted while the 
Pennsylvania General Assembly is empowered to regulate elections, the 
courts reserve the right to invalidate legislative action when it violates the 
constitution.120 
 
 113 League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania, 178 A.3d at 777. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 778. 
 116 Id. at 801-02. See Id. at 802, note 63 which expressly dismisses plaintiffs’ request for 
review under principles of free expression and equal protection instead asserting the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution without regard to the Federal counterparts or provisions of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Note 63 provides a determinative stance to place a boundary around 
the court’s ruling and the potential review by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 117 Id. at 804; see also Douglas, supra note 75, at 100 (“[T]he U.S. Constitution does not 
grant the right to vote. It instead defines the right through a negative gloss, detailing the vari-
ous reasons states cannot limit the franchise.”). 
 118 League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania, 178 A.3d at 802. 
 119 Id. at 809 (quoting CHARLES R. BUCKALEW, AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF PENNSYLVANIA 10 (1883)). 
 120 Id. 
120 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:1 
Notably, this was not the first time that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court addressed this issue. In Erfer v. Commonwealth, the court held that: 
It is true that the U.S. Constitution has granted our legislature the 
power to craft congressional reapportionment plans. Yet, we see 
no indication that such a grant of power simultaneously sus-
pended the constitution of our Commonwealth vis-à-vis congres-
sional reapportionment. Without clear support for the radical con-
clusion that our Commonwealth’s Constitution is nullified in 
challenges to congressional reapportionment plans, it would be 
highly inappropriate for us to circumscribe the operation of the 
organic legal document of our Commonwealth.121 
Accordingly, the court determined that political gerrymandering 
does present a justiciable question, and that voter rights are a state con-
struct and therefore more properly addressed under state constitutions.122 
The Pennsylvania Plan violated the “free and equal” language of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution, and the remedy was to require the legislature 
to change the redistricting map with judicial oversight.123 As it was em-
powered to act, and such action does not impede federal law, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court struck down the gerrymandered map without 
ever needing to invoke the Constitution.124 
CONCLUSION 
It is our contention that the most successful challenges to political 
gerrymandering will be found at the state level, similar to what occurred 
in Pennsylvania, regardless of any federal implications of Gill. State chal-
lenges insulate courts’ decisions when appealing under explicit enumer-
ated voting rights not necessarily present in the Federal Constitution.125 
State challenges also can be faster, as they have clear potential to reach 
decisions on the merits sooner than federal cases do.126 Furthermore, 
 
 121 Erfer v. Commonwealth, 794 A.2d 325, 331 (Pa. 2002). 
 122 League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 181 A.3d 1083, 1084 
(Pa. 2018) (per curiam). 
 123 League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 822 (Pa. 
2018). 
 124 See id. at 825. 
 125 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (per curiam) (“[T]he individual citizen has no fed-
eral constitutional right to vote . . . .”); Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 237 (1944) (rec-
ognizing that decisions of the highest court in a state are generally conclusive upon the Su-
preme Court). 
 126 Compare League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania, 175 A.3d 282 (Pa. 2018) (taking 
state court just over seven months to reach a final decision from the initial proceedings) with 
Gill, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (taking federal court nearly three years to reach a conclusion from the 
2019] BREAKING THE BALLOT BOX 121 
while statutory changes can provide temporary relief from gerrymandered 
maps, statutes can change from year to year.127 Ultimately, state judicial 
challenges or state constitutional amendments present the best hope for 
addressing gerrymandering and neutralizing redistricting influences, in 
turn making elections fairer for the people of the United States and the 
people of each individual state. 
The Supreme Court has seemed to express a willingness to let states 
address political gerrymandering independent of the federal courts.128 In 
Growe v. Emison, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to past precedent 
that reapportionment is a right of the states rooted in federalism principles 
and not in federal courts.129 Relying on Scott v. Germano, the Court com-
mitted to be deferential to each state’s right to retain jurisdiction to ad-
dress state-specific actions, specifically redistricting.130 Growe utilizes 
powerful language to show that states are the proper venue to address po-
litical gerrymandering where federal courts have been instructed to en-
courage state challenges and state solutions.131 This past encouragement 
displays not only a commitment to federalism, but also expressly empow-
ers state courts to address political gerrymandering head-on.132 
Of course, state constitutional amendments may also provide a suc-
cessful solution. With this in mind, it may be more attractive to pass state 
constitutional amendments incorporating a “free and fair elections” 
clause, as is present in Pennsylvania, in order to grant greater authority to 
state courts to decide this matter on state constitutional grounds. Though 
this option would bind state courts and offer an “out,” effectively nullify-
ing the need for federal interpretation, passing constitutional amendments 
is time consuming and contrary to the expedited need to address the issue 
 
initial proceedings). The Pennsylvania court granted a motion to expedite and decide, which 
appear more readily accessible in state courts. 
 127 See LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES 
AND RECENT TRENDS, at SUMMARY (2014) (“When one of these ‘substantive’ canons applies, 
the Court frequently requires a ‘clear statement’ of congressional intent to negate it. A com-
monly invoked ‘substantive’ canon is that Congress does not intend to change judge-made 
law.”). 
 128 See, e.g., Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). 
 129 Id. (“In the reapportionment context, the Court has required federal judges to defer 
consideration of disputes involving redistricting where the State, through its legislative or ju-
dicial branch, has begun to address that highly political task itself.”) (emphasis in original). 
 130 Id. (quoting Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 409 (1965) (“The power of the judiciary 
of a State to require valid reapportionment or to formulate a valid redistricting plan has not 
only been recognized by this Court but appropriate action by the States in such cases has been 
specifically encouraged.”)). 
 131 Id.; see Scott, 381 U.S. at 409 (citing to additional case law). 
 132 See Growe, 507 U.S. at 33. 
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of gerrymandering within the current socio-legal and electoral land-
scape.133 
This is not to say that federal challenges will never work. Justice Ka-
gan kept the possibility of addressing political gerrymandering on the fed-
eral level open in her Gill concurrence, after the case is addressed on re-
mand.134 In order to be successful, the argument would be built upon the 
foundation of First Amendment freedom of association, rather than the 
dominant arguments of Equal Protection violations.135 Plaintiffs should 
also consider having the injured political party initiate the challenge in 
order satisfy standing requirements, which became the primary issue in 
Gill.136 No matter how the argument is considered, there is still no guar-
antee of success at the federal level, especially given the lack of assurance 
in Justice Kennedy’s swing vote following his retirement. This uncer-
tainty only bolsters the notion that state challenges remain the superior 
approach to addressing political gerrymandering. 
There are limits to this argument, of course, but the limitations are 
far outnumbered by the privileges and rights gained by successful chal-
lenges. State challenges do not always guarantee success, especially in 
states unwilling to go beyond the federal interpretation as it currently 
stands137 or in states with narrower constitutional protections. While 
many states already have the constitutional framework to be successful 
by providing the right to vote and language of fairness that is not present 
in the Federal Constitution,138 state parties, the possible petitioners with 
the best chance at success, may simply lack the willingness to move for-
ward beyond the status quo. 
Political gerrymandering remains a threat in the United States with-
out a clear, judicial remedy available in federal court, especially following 
what could have been landmark cases, Gill and Benisek.139 Recently, state 
 
 133 See Primo J. Cruz, Note, POLS Gone Wild: Why State Constitutional Equality Provi-
sions are a Proper Solution to Partisan Gerrymandering, 42 RUTGERS L.J. 927, 929 (2011) 
(“[C]omprehensive redistricting reform through constitutional change can take a long time 
and is usually achieved only after successive failures.”). 
 134 Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934 (2018). 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 See e.g., STATE COURTS ADOPTING FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE: CASE-BY-
CASE ADOPTIONISM OR PROSPECTIVE LOCKSTEPPING, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 1502 
(2005) (explaining that state courts often interpret their constitutions in “lockstep” with federal 
interpretations). 
 138 See Douglas, supra note 75, at 133. 
 139 Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-
1161) (statement of Paul Smith, answering the justices of the Court) (“[T]his is a cusp of a 
really serious . . . problem as gerrymandering becomes more sophisticated with computers and 
data analytics . . . and an electorate that’s very polarized and more predictable than it’s ever 
been before. If you let this go . . . we’re not going to have a judicial remedy for this problem, 
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courts have provided the guidance to challenge extreme partisan gerry-
mandering. Gerrymandering remains a very serious problem, but it is one 
that can be solved at the state level. In the next decade, as more maps are 
proffered to or by state legislatures, state courts may provide the perfect 
solution to cut off the last limb of this anti-democratic beast. 
 
in 2020, you’re going to have a festival of copycat gerrymandering the likes of which this 
country has never seen. And it may be that you can protect the Court from seeming political, 
but the country is going to lose faith in democracy big time because voters . . . everywhere are 
going to be like the voters in Wisconsin and, no, it really doesn’t matter whether I vote.”). 
